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Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Eternal Return 
“Six thousand feet beyond man and time.”1 
 
In the Western world, we have a pronounced affinity for understanding time as 
something ultimately simple.  Despite our recognition of the differences in subjective 
perception of the passing of intervals, we tacitly affirm that time itself must objectively 
follow a comprehensible structure of unidirectional flow which, like the commonly cited 
river metaphor, begins at one point and is definitively moving towards another.  Thanks 
especially to the Judeo-Christian model of history plowing inevitably towards a 
conclusion at the end of days, even in the absence of direct religious influence, our 
intuitive understanding of time remains linear.  We see this model addressed and 
contested by metaphysicians throughout the ages, but only rarely do we glimpse a 
philosophy that is able to cogently upturn this intuitively correct ideal.  In his notion of 
eternal return of the same∗2, Friedrich Nietzsche positions himself as perhaps the most 
profound proponent of a temporal doctrine that refutes the problematic simplicity of the 
telic model preceding it.   
                                                 
∗
 Throughout this work, I have chosen to follow Joan Stambaugh in the alternating usage of return and 
recurrence in referring to Nietzsche’s concept.  The two German words that Nietzsche utilizes, 
“wiederkunft” and “wiederkehr”, correspond with return and recurrence respectively in common 
translations.  However, Nietzsche’s own usage varies enough to make a definitive analysis on the basis of 
this difference seem somewhat arbitrary and conducive to selective interpretation on the part of the 
translator.   
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 With only three published elaborations, a brief interlude within his autobiography, 
and a handful of unpublished writings within what is now circulated as The Will to 
Power, Nietzsche managed to confound the likes of philosophical minds for ages in his 
wake.  The doctrine of eternal return of the same has been touted as one of Western 
philosophy’s most confusing tenets.  It is ambiguous and infuriatingly paradoxical, yet 
impossible to ignore and vital to the understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole.  
Heidegger calls it the roots of Nietzsche’s philosophical tree,3 without which no branches 
could ever grow.  Considering the breadth of Nietzsche’s work, this is no small 
statement.   
Despite the elegance that his cyclical description creates, in refuting the linear 
model of time that Western culture has come to tacitly accept Nietzsche runs in to a 
number of problems of his own.  In this work I will investigate the thought of eternal 
return of the same through careful analysis of each representation of the doctrine, 
followed by misconceptions that Nietzsche himself predicted, and finally through the 
analysis of contemporary interpretations of this idea.  Though it is a daunting task to 
definitively assert what Nietzsche meant in his writings on this nearly inscrutable topic, it 
is certainly helpful to point out the insights and especially the errors present in popular 
critiques.  By understanding what eternal return is not, we can come one step closer to 
discovering what it is and to truly facing the challenge that this doctrine poses to us.   
 
Three Deliberate Explications: 
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 Though enigmatic references and ponderings can be traced all the way back to 
journals and letters from Nietzsche’s nineteenth year,4 it wasn’t until his fifth published 
work The Gay Science that he makes blatant reference to the thought of eternal return.  
Beginning at the end of book four of this text, he writes what will come to be the most 
poetic statement of his idea.  Here Nietzsche asks us to imagine that in our darkest, 
loneliest hour a soothsaying demon creeps into our chamber and whispers his mephitic 
truth into our ears.5  What he tells is that everything we have thus experienced and will 
ever experience will come to us again, not one time and not ten times but again and again 
for all eternity.  Nothing new can ever occur, nothing novel.  All that can recur is that 
which has been, and furthermore all that will come in our lives has already come to pass 
innumerable times before. 
 Fully comprehending the demon’s words, Nietzsche believes, will necessarily 
lead in one of two directions.  One individual might reel in dismay at the eternal 
damnation of being forced to relive the same existence in its entirety again and again.  He 
will curse the demon and the poisonous venom his tongue has unleashed, rejecting the 
inane meaninglessness of his fate.  Realizing that the burden of his life’s existence is in 
fact the boulder of Sisyphus, this man will shriek out in dismay at the never-ending labor 
before him.   
 Alternately, there is the possibility that one might hear the demon’s words and 
rejoice.  He might praise the new truth revealed to him and, whether true or not, will that 
it should be the case that his lot be one of eternal repetition.  To Nietzsche, it is this latter 
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man that has fully actualized the ethical imperative that the idea of recurrence carries 
with it.  Namely, one must live his life such that every choice he makes is one that he 
would be willing to repeat for all eternity.  The weight of even the simplest decision 
becomes suffused with an importance beyond measure when this imperative is taken to 
heart.  Indifference in light of eternal return is not an option.  Faced with the knowledge 
of the demon’s truth, one is either changed forevermore or crushed beneath the weight of 
the burden.6 
 Immediately following his beautiful description of the greatest burden, Nietzsche 
provides the first chapter of his subsequent book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  In this novel, 
a stylistic departure for Nietzsche but what he himself considered his magnum opus,7 the 
doctrine of eternal recurrence forms the conceptual substrate for the entire book.  In these 
pages Zarathustra begins to realize that his lot is not simply to teach of the Overman to be 
strived for, but rather to teach of eternal return.8  It is this gradual comprehension and 
struggling to come to terms with the weight of this ideal that carries the reader along with 
Nietzsche’s protagonist into the simultaneous anguish and exuberance of affirming the 
eternal recurrence of all things. 
It comes as little surprise that, as we wade alongside Zarathustra into the supposed 
veracity of this doctrine, we see the first hint of Nietzsche’s cosmological defense of his 
belief.  In his hour of deep sickness at the tenets imparted to him, Zarathustra’s animal 
friends come to him.  The serpent and the eagle speak to Zarathustra such: 
“The soul is as mortal as the body.  But the knot of causes in which I am 
entangled recurs and will create me again.  I myself belong to the causes of the 
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eternal recurrence.  I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, 
with this serpent—not to a new life or a better life or a similar life:  I come back 
eternally to this same, selfsame life…”9 
 We see then immediately the tinges of a metaphysical defense beginning to 
emerge.  Here Nietzsche presumes a mechanistic viewpoint of the universe when he 
writes of a “knot of causes”.  The commonly held presumption of this model of thinking 
assures that for every given event there must be a cause.  That cause in turn must too 
have its own cause and its cause its own and so on.  The knot here mentioned is meant to 
represent our entrapment between the many forces that create us and those we in turn are 
predetermined to instigate.  We are wholly bound.  What is vital to stress within this 
passage is the early insistence on this mechanistic, causal link being apparently validated 
through its inclusion within the framework that guarantees eternal return.  Every event 
and every existent necessarily being entangled within a web of causation provides a 
crucial element to the cosmological proof of eternal return that will be elaborated upon 
below.   
 Nietzsche’s personal understanding of causation is more veraciously clarified in 
other texts when he refers to such conceptions of causality as being leftover errors in 
language.  Separating “the lightning from its flash”10 is the mistake that man has the 
tendency to make when splitting an effect away from the cause that brought it into being.  
In this light, the entire concept of a chain of causation becomes fallacious.  This subtle 
yet devastating attack on the whole of scientific thought must be recognized as an actual 
instance of idol-smashing that Nietzsche brings us along to witness.  Be that as it may, 
the fact that this same philosopher time and again refers to just such a causal web in his 
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defense of eternal return should clearly stress to us that there is an important rhetorical 
device being employed.  Nietzsche’s apparent assent to commonly held notions of 
causation should not be read too literally unless interpreted through the lens of what 
seems to be his larger aim.  This point will be expanded upon further as the proofs for 
eternal return conclude in elucidation.   
 Apart from the early presaging of the metaphysical side of recurrence, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra is also important in its introduction of at least two more concepts that are 
vital to a thorough understanding of the precept.  Both are what Nietzsche considers to be 
misconceptions of his doctrine.  The first of these is surely the most confounding upon 
immediate encounter.  It arises when Zarathustra recites the story of a most peculiar 
incident to a group of sailors.  While climbing a treacherous mountain path, Zarathustra is 
besieged by the “leaden thoughts” of the dwarf clutching his back, a dramatic symbol of 
the spirit of gravity who strives to pull Zarathustra downward, even as he struggles to 
climb higher. Eventually, he tires of the dwarf.  Casting him to the ground Zarathustra 
challenges this spirit to comprehend the burdensome magnitude of the thought that he 
possesses:  the thought of eternal return. 11   
 A stone gateway stretches before the two, arching over the path that winds in each 
direction, seemingly on into infinity.  It is precisely this image of eternity that Nietzsche 
allows his protagonist to convey.  Etched upon the gateway is the title “Moment”.  Using 
the obvious symbolism present, Zarathustra confronts the dwarf to comprehend the 
magnitude of what he is seeing.  Eternally the pathways of time stretch in either direction, 
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yet at this point, they are an affront to each other.  In the “glance of an eye”∗ these two 
eternities accost one another in contradiction and yet somehow converge.12   
 The dwarf’s simple answer to this riddle is that time itself is a circle.  The two 
infinite roads meet again where the loop becomes closed, eliminating apparent 
inconsistency.  This is instantly and vehemently decried by Zarathustra to be far too 
simplistic.13  When the notion of eternal return is taken at the surface level, it is difficult 
to see just what it so mistaken about the dwarf’s understanding of time.  Zarathustra does 
not say that his opponent is outright wrong but rather that he is making it too easy for 
himself.  Why is it that Nietzsche’s doctrine cannot be so easily categorized as simply 
cyclical?  Interpreting the answer to this question will help to clarify exactly what makes 
recurrence into what must be deemed the greatest burden.   
 “Behold this gateway, dwarf!” Zarathustra commands.14  It is precisely the 
disrespect for Moment that leads to the dwarf’s oversimplification.  Comprehending the 
subtlety of the difference between the two conceptions is not easy, but the key lies in the 
overwhelming awe of the power that lies in the Moment.  Zarathustra assures us that what 
has passed through the gateway must have done so before.  Echoing the causal links once 
again, he mentions the moonbeams, the spiders, and even the whispers of their very 
conversation dragging with them through the gateway everything that came before and 
will come hence.15  Perhaps the dwarf can respect this notion, even if not appreciate its 
magnitude, but what his simplistic answer provides is the abstract notion of the two 
eternal paths uniting in some distant, unknowable time.  The two eternities form a closed 
                                                 
∗
 Arguably a more precise translation of the German word “Augenblick” that Nietzsche places as the 
gateway’s inscription. 
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loop somewhere out there in obscure infinity.  What Zarathustra wants him to appreciate 
is the unification of those endless roads at the gateway Moment.  Though this distinction 
seems overstated, it is of the utmost importance to truly respecting the thought of eternal 
return. 
 With Moment being given this priority as the ultimate union between two 
infinities, he who stands at the gateway, lucidly acknowledging the roads before and 
behind him, is imbued with a power and responsibility incomparably great.16  This forms 
the crux of the ethical, existential imperative of the thought of eternal return.  Even 
within the unbroken flow of eternity that surges on, in the glancing of the eye we have 
power.  Though Nietzsche asserts that all which has happened will happen again, 
unfalteringly, within Moment we have the ability to choose what will recur.  We have the 
responsibility to decide our actions, knowing that every step we make along the roadway 
we will be forced to retread again and again for all eternity.  Beneath the gateway, we 
have power to command how the recurrence will come to pass, though we cannot affect 
whether or not it will.   
 This is a profound affirmation of our responsibility, and merely scoffing that time 
is a circle refuses to acknowledge that profundity.  However, with such a guaranteed 
recurrence set forth for us, we are forced to acknowledge that every step towards progress 
that we seem to make is ultimately an act of indifference.  If even the venomous spiders 
of what Nietzsche elsewhere deems ressentiment must recur, then how can any step 
towards betterment be seen as anything but an act of futility?  The small man may allow 
his apathy to carry him through the gateway Moment, but as a part of the closed universe 
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he too indeed must recur.  This idea too weighs heavily on Zarathustra’s mind.  In fact, it 
is the very realization that even the unworthy small men of slave morality must return 
eternally that nauseates him.17  That such a person could have power over eternity is 
difficult to bear, but one must face the importance of Moment to begin to understand 
recurrence. 
 When the dwarf utters his quip that “time is a circle” he makes a further mistake 
that Thus Spoke Zarathustra allows Nietzsche to address.  What the dwarf is doing here is 
chanting empty talk and hollow words in dealing with an issue that demands more.  
Nietzsche insists we understand that eternal return is not a catch-phrase or witty slogan 
that likes of which should be adhered to automobile bumpers.  Recurrence is rather 
something so disturbingly or invigoratingly important that it cannot be converted into 
mere song. 
Even Nietzsche’s animal friends become guilty of this when in trying to cheer 
him from his convalescence.  “O you buffoons and barrel organs, be silent!” Zarathustra 
chides, “Must you immediately turn this too into a hurdy-gurdy song?”18  Their song and 
dance fails to recognize the magnitude of the thought that possesses him.19  Though the 
eagle and the serpent surely comprehend the tenet more firmly than the dwarf was able to 
manage, their pleasant description of the world as seen through the eyes of eternal return 
begins to border on platitudes and empty talk. 
Indeed, the weight of this heaviest burden does not, at times, seem to bear down 
upon them as it does to Zarathustra.  Their “hurdy-gurdy song” praises the affirmative 
power of return as the will choosing what will recur infinitely yet ignores the darker side 
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that Zarathustra has the most difficult time accepting.  With the recurrence of the small 
man, the tarantulas of revenge, actions in contradiction to their poisons begin to seem 
useless.20  If it isn’t even worth the trouble to counteract the life-negating small men, then 
how can we meaningfully affirm life?  It is just this question that Nietzsche wishes to 
face head-on.  He seems all-too-aware that the weighty, burdensome notion of his may 
become nothing more than a catchy, whimsical song to minds incapable of truly sharing a 
bed with the demon of eternity. 
Nietzsche’s third published explanation of eternal recurrence can be found in the 
pages of Beyond Good and Evil.  In this brief allusion, Nietzsche enigmatically 
references his doctrine in a half-page passage formed by one immense run-on sentence.  
The fact that this entry is structured in such a way is surely not accidental, nor is the 
obscurely inscrutable final three words written in Latin: “circulus, vitiosus, deus”.21  
These words translate to “circle”, “vicious”, and “god” respectively, but because each is 
left in the nominative form, the precise structure of what is intended by this phrase is left 
ambiguous.  There is no reason to doubt that this is precisely what Nietzsche intended.   
What is most worth noting for general purposes in this passage is the reiteration of 
the ethical imperative to be found within his notion of eternal return.  Here Nietzsche 
speaks eloquently about the powerful, world-affirming man who not only is satisfied with 
what has come to pass in his life but loves his fate so dearly that he wishes nothing more 
than to live it all again for eternity.  This higher man is not grudgingly accepting of the 
fate of recurrence, an act in itself daunting.  Rather he is able to shout insatiably “da 
capo”, or “from the top”,22 again and again, never tiring from his lot, and never 
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grimacing at the sight of the boulder and the hill set before him.  Here Nietzsche 
poetically reminds us of the requirements of living truly within this framework. 
 It is this kind of poetry that is the most unifying element of the three published 
references to eternal return.  Though never suffering a lack of certainty and assertiveness, 
the prose in which these original texts were written leaves them open for a level of 
interpretation as to the metaphysical and cosmological status with which we are asked to 
comprehend eternal return.  The element that becomes such an issue of contention for 
many philosophers since is the actual proofs that are given in the Nachlass, Nietzsche’s 
personal journals and unpublished writings.  While briefly and stylistically addressed 
within the pages of Thus Spoke Zarathustra with the mention of every cause returning, 
bringing with it everything that came before, it is not until these personal writings that the 
actual metaphysical doctrine of recurrence becomes prevalent.  The notes and writings 
that formed the Nachlass eventually were brought together and published posthumously 
in the compilation that we now know as The Will to Power.  While these writings do take 
place within Nietzsche’s unpublished journals, it is as much an error to disregard them as 
unimportant as it is to praise them as his highest, most genuine revelations.  For this 
reason, we must consult their pages to fully understand Nietzsche’s burden. 
 
The Proofs: 
 
 The first formulation of Nietzsche’s cosmological proof of eternal return comes 
directly on the heels of the animals’ speech concerning the “knot of causes” seen in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra.23  In the posthumous publications this is elaborated upon to create a 
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scientifically based doctrine that addresses the necessary result of a universe comprised 
of a limited amount of matter and energy, yet an infinite amount of time.  No matter how 
many seemingly infinite numbers of combinations we could imagine for the substances 
and powers within our world, with the infinite nature of time to extend before us, it is 
only a matter of when a precise combination of matter and energy will occur that will 
lead to a single event being repeated.24  One event recurring entails that everything that 
led to that event, all the elements entangled within its web, must also repeat.  Nothing 
happens without the causal links that have brought it into existence.  No single piece of 
that causal chain can repeat without necessitating the entirety of the chain.  With a 
universe compacted together, atom to atom in the connectedness of causality, a single 
repetition guarantees entire repetition.   
 This supposition could be overturned by one of two ideas presumed in the 
premises.  If space is not finite, then there would be no need to suppose that it could ever 
run out of combinations of its constituency.  Nietzsche outright dismisses this idea, as he 
contends that the very idea of space came about as the result of the imaginary creation of 
empty space.  Force is all that is real to Nietzsche, as he often reminds us.25  Time must 
be infinite for this theory to congeal as well.  Though it is difficult to secure an absolute 
reason for this, time in Nietzsche’s conception is considered quite real.  Contrasting space 
to which he himself has been known to link it, time is not bounded by constraints of 
finitude.26 
It is vital to understand however, that the basis for his proof of the infinity of time 
comes from the disproof of the commonly held notion that an infinite regression into the 
past leads into contradiction.  When one typically asserts that the past could not have 
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been infinite, as the ends necessary to reach the present would never have been reached, 
that individual makes what Nietzsche considers a fallacy.27  Infinite regression is not the 
mental process implored when one takes the direction of time to be inconsequential.  
Standing at the present moment, the head of eternity becomes the now, and the eternities 
stretching in either direction are no longer logical contradictions.  The infinite regression 
is no longer any more contradictory than the supposedly more coherent thought of time 
infinitely stretching before us into the future. 
The picture that we find emerging once again is that of a coiled snake, feeding on 
its own excrement.28  Like the first mythical living creature, a serpentine ouroboros 
described by Plato in his creation story,29 this beast of time lives without beginning and 
without end.  It simply exists, spinning constantly in circles upon itself in a never ending 
cycle of devouring.  Even within the pages of his more supposedly scientific approaches 
to philosophy, we find the same penchant for vivid imagery and stylistic prose.   
Another formulation of essentially the same contention is made in Nietzsche’s 
discussion of equilibrium.  Non-becoming and the possibility of a state of finality poses a 
problem, once we accept the premise of the infinity of time.  If time is not eternal and 
infinity is not to be found on each opposing side of Moment, then there should be no 
changes at all.  Were entropy possible at all within our universe, it would necessarily 
have to have occurred by now.30  If the linear model is accurate, then it must be the case 
that with the infinite time prior we should have been able to attain a state where things 
cease to become.  This is not what we find.  Contrarily, in our universe and indeed in our 
very lives there is no being, only constant becoming.  There is no goal, no telos.  If it had 
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been possible for the universe to attain either being or nothingness, it would have 
happened by now.  The fact that this has not occurred proves that it never can. 
 This statement of the impossibility of being in a constant, fixed way is worth 
expanding upon.  Nietzsche asserts in ways reminiscent of his favored pre-Socratic 
Heraclitus that everything is in constant change or flux.  There is no such thing as being 
for the individual existent.  Because change is universally constant in this surging of time 
through the gates of Moment, a shiftless kind of becoming is the permanent state.31  
Nietzsche writes: 
“You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a monster of a great 
year, which must, like an hourglass, turn over again and again so that it may run 
down and run out again; and all these years are alike in what is greatest as in what 
is smallest…”32 
 
 This great year is nothing less than our universe entire.  This distinction, however, 
should not be interpreted as a denial of being entirely.  Being is, on the universal scale, 
quite possible.  Consisting of the eternal becoming of its composition, the expanse of our 
world is a whole that exists without instigation.  The constituent parts can be said to hold 
being in themselves only in relation to the universe, as each part is said to contain within 
it the entirety of the whole.33 
 In both of these metaphysical formulations of eternal recurrence we see a 
dramatic refutation of the previously commonplace picture of the universe as having 
beginning and definite progression towards some kind of goal.  Utilizing the methods of 
the mechanistic worldview to prove a situation so very contrary to the notion of a telic, 
orderly universe flies in the face of the Enlightenment ideal of rationality guiding us 
toward our highest ends.  The prized rationality with which the world can be understood 
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is here thrown into doubt by its use in apparently proving the opposite, a world without 
purpose that repeats eternally, unchangingly.34  We cannot discard the idea that this doubt 
may have been exactly what Nietzsche was aiming for in his cosmological proofs.   
 Careful analysis of Nietzsche’s work will show that he has already used the tools 
of the “enemy” to strengthen his case, as in the proclamation of the Overman.  In the first 
chapters of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s protagonist echoes the madman 
introduced in The Gay Science when he declares that “God is dead.”35  In the parable of 
the madman, Nietzsche showed that without God as our foundation for morality, all 
judgments of right and wrong become meaningless.  Without the anchoring within divine 
will, objective morality goes reeling from its harness, like the earth unhinged from the 
sun and set adrift into the abyss.36  Zarathustra takes this a step further and proposes the 
Overman as the new goal for mankind.  Because nihilism is the result of a world without 
objectively based morals, the Overman becomes the new paragon towards which we must 
all strive.  So the very telic model of goal-oriented values transposed onto the new 
paragon becomes evident.  God’s divine will is supplanted with the act of paving the way 
for the Overman.  With the same tools of the opposing ideology, Nietzsche is able to 
create a contradictory, yet similarly purposive, ideal. 
It should not be assumed by this methodology that Nietzsche would have 
personally acquiesced to what he considered a fallacious divide between cause and effect 
any more than it should be assumed that Nietzsche believed in an absolute, objective 
value created by the struggle towards the Overman.  Each usage is one of paralleling 
argumentation.  To state that Nietzsche believed in objective, otherworldly values is a 
confused misinterpretation of the method behind the creation of the Overman, just as 
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asserting that he defended traditional causation is a misunderstanding of the instruments 
used in positing eternal return.  However, paradoxically, it must also be stressed that 
despite the debatable rhetoric, there should be little doubt surrounding Nietzsche’s 
genuine belief in the need for both the Overman and eternal return.  
 Another factor that cannot be ignored in understanding the cosmological proofs of 
recurrence is the atmosphere surrounding Nietzsche’s philosophy.  While comparing 
directly to the works of other philosophers and scientists can lead to inappropriate 
conclusions, we cannot suppose that his thoughts, or the forms they were bound to adhere 
to more accurately, would not be affected by the particular intellectual spirit hanging in 
the air of Nietzsche’s Europe.  No philosophical paradigm comes about in a cultural or 
intellectual vacuum.37  The fact that Nietzsche uses concepts such as the law of 
conservation of energy to prove his eternal return38 emphasizes the point that he was 
responding to the mechanistic model profuse in the mindset of nineteenth century 
Europe.  The teleological remnants of traditional theology are similarly his impetus. 
 As noted before, Nietzsche’s work seems to stand on the heels of the very beasts 
he wishes to slay.  Using the weapons of his adversaries effectively shows that his 
theories are just as plausible if only equally as provable.  While it may or may not color 
our opinion as to the truth or falsity of Nietzsche’s intended claims with his scientific 
proofs, we must appreciate the strong possibility that disproving the mechanistic and telic 
pictures of the universe by proving a contradictory paradigm with the same tools of 
reason was exactly Nietzsche’s goal.39  Despite the work of the Romantics before him to 
chisel away at such certainty, Nietzsche was still in the midst of a scientifically driven 
society.  But science, like every other framework to Nietzsche, was not possessed of any 
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avenue of actual truth but was rather simply another interpretation.40  The rhetorical 
device that he hoped to employ by utilizing this interpretive framework should become 
our focus when investigating the cosmological proofs of eternal return.  What did he hope 
to accomplish by speaking in these terms?  To fully understand Nietzsche’s proofs, we 
must address them in this way. 
 
Two Contemporary Interpretations: 
 
 Nietzsche did overall leave the cosmological proofs of his theory out of the 
deliberately published works.  This is a point that we should not ignore.  But the fact that 
this is the case does not mean that he himself found these proofs to be irrelevant or that 
we can legitimately ignore them.41  In fact, it is entirely on account of this metaphysical 
side of eternal return that Karl Löwith finds the ammunition to attack the doctrine as 
incoherent.  What is praiseworthy in his work is that Löwith does not simply ignore this 
side of eternal return as the overreaching calamities of a philosopher dilettante, posing as 
physicist.  Rather Löwith takes these claims so seriously that he asserts the cosmological 
meaning to have overridden the importance of the existential imperative.42  
 What Löwith calls the “anthropological equation” of eternal return is what is 
typically considered the existential imperative.43  This title refers to Nietzsche’s 
realization that mankind must have a goal.  Correlative to his replacement of the will of 
God with the act of striving towards the Overman, in a similar way Nietzsche places the 
will to create a life worth reliving again and again at the head of the anthropological 
imperative.  In eternal return, a goal is acquired that reaches beyond the world we 
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comprehend yet refrains from the appeal to divinity that has so far provided Western 
society with a telos for thousands of years.  This form of atheism is, to Löwith, ironically 
a form of religion.44  Things become troublesome however when the metaphysical 
necessity tries to unite with this new religion. 
 Regardless of its legitimacy in the realm of physics, Löwith argues that the very 
supposition of the metaphysically absolute nature of eternity recurring nullifies the 
importance of the anthropological equation.  The cosmological certainty of an eternally 
returning world is the pinnacle of absurdity.45  The universe will uncaringly repeat itself, 
bringing the great man, the small man, the moonbeam, and the tarantula all along for the 
ride.  Indiscriminately all things must recur.  For this reason, what point can there be in 
an existential imperative that attempts to find normative value in the affirming of 
recurrence?  What meaning is there in saying “I willed it to be so” when it will be as such 
no matter what you decree?  If everything has happened before and will happen again, 
then you will do as you have done.46  There seems little point in an imperative to feign 
mutability.   
 Where we begin to see problems in this interpretation is when the concept of 
willing is investigated more closely.  Within our commonplace understanding of willing, 
it is indeed nearly unthinkable to follow what Nietzsche seems to be imploring us to do, 
to will backwards.  Under his existential imperative, we find ourselves forced to not 
merely accept that which has been but to actively will that it should be so.  The will is 
often understood to be a “prisoner” to time.47  As this captivated force, the will 
commonly finds itself anguishing over that which, through the passing of days, it no 
longer has the power to change.  If eternal return is the case, then indeed Löwith would 
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seem to be correct.  Every step we take we have taken before.  How can we will what has 
occurred already? 
 Nietzsche’s answer comes again within the pages of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
Here we find Zarathustra engaged in precisely this debate with his disciples.  He admits 
that the will is captive to the dreadful “it was”, but affirms the strength of the redemptive 
power of learning to will backwards.  Thus the devastating “it was” can be converted into 
the affirmative, “thus I willed it; thus I shall will it.”48  Willing itself need not be directed 
towards the changing of what has been.  Rather, the power of the backwards thinking will 
is in amor fati, the love of one’s fate.  In a cry back to the Stoics, Nietzsche seems to be 
proposing that the only freedom that can be exercised is that of willing, genuinely 
willing, that your world be cyclical.  The fact that it will be regardless is in support of the 
magnitude of this act.  It does not remove the potency from the act of willing that it 
should be so regardless.  On the contrary, it strengthens the importance of one saying that 
if given unlimited choices, he would still want it to be no other way than it is. 
 This confusingly unique perspective on willing is appropriately equivalent to the 
absurdist philosophy of Albert Camus, one of Nietzsche’s intellectual descendants.  As 
has been alluded prior, using the mythological character for philosophical double-duty, 
Camus places the legendary Sisyphus on the mountaintop, looking down to his boulder as 
it tumbles away from him.  Condemned for eternity by the gods for transgressions made 
on earth, Sisyphus is forced to eternally retrieve his boulder and push it to the top of the 
mountain again and again, each time seeing it hopelessly roll down the mountain away 
from him just as he crests the apex.  While seemingly powerless in this situation, 
Sisyphus gleans an existential potency in his reaction to the situation.  This man’s power 
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and control lie directly in the idea that, were he to be given a choice, he would want for 
his eternal future to proceed no other way.49  This is a power that the gods cannot touch.  
This is a strength that the universe cannot bend into submission.  Willing the inevitable is 
not to be understood as consciously aligning yourself with the way that the world works, 
then claiming victory when it obviously comes to pass.  Contrarily, the power of the will 
is in understanding the metaphysical alternatives that could be yet consciously refusing 
them all. 
 To believe that you cannot have an effect on the universe, since you cannot retain 
memories between cycles of repetition and nothing that you change now will alter when 
the loop begins anew, is equally as fallacious as believing that any alteration that you do 
make upon your lot is a result of it having happened prior.50  These forms of fatalism 
have no place in Nietzsche’s understanding of the will.  There is a qualitative difference 
between the acceptance of fatalistic doctrines and the affirmation of his existential 
imperative.  So perhaps Löwith is correct to point out that what has been will be 
regardless, but this cannot circumvent the importance of what he deems the 
anthropological equation of eternal return.  The freedom found within willing one’s 
place, with true amor fati, is strengthened by the understanding that it is fate and not 
merely choice that enlightens the thinker of eternal recurrence.  An attempt in scientific 
terms to prove that this doctrine is the case must not detract from the necessity of living 
as though it was regardless.  Simply believing in eternal return is enough to change a man 
either towards the terror of nihilism or the exhilaration of affirming your life’s choices 
forevermore. 
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 There is a kind of compatibilism present between the necessity of the 
metaphysical doctrine and the imperative of the existential that Löwith seems to overlook 
in his critique. This form of understanding invites the use of a parable that connects 
intimately with the issue of existential relevance.51  Suppose that you are walking across 
a lonely bridge in winter when, glancing down, you happen to see a child flailing and 
screaming for help in the middle of the icy water.  You are a strong swimmer, yet you 
know that it is a significant risk to your own life to jump haphazardly into the water to 
rescue the youth.  Though the cosmological doctrine implies that you have no real power 
in this situation and will only do as you have always done and will always do for all 
eternity, the existential imperative would not be trumped.  Were it possible for you to 
freeze time and consume every book on the topic of eternal return, causality, 
determinism, and free will that you could find, you would afterward still be no closer to 
making the decision of whether or not to risk your own life on behalf of the screaming 
child.  The cosmological proofs can show us what the universe may or may not be like, 
but only the existentially relevant imperative can dictate to us how we ought to live.  In 
this situation, Nietzsche would surely urge that we choose the option that we would be 
willing to choose again for all eternity.  The literal cosmological reality would not 
undermine the importance of being, in every sense, free to decide at every given juncture. 
 What Nietzsche wants to heap upon our shoulders is the idea that our decision on 
atop that bridge is not confined within the shell of some fleeting “now” but rather a now 
that will come again to us forevermore.  The now of Moment is the union of the two 
eternities.  We must understand that in Moment, it is not the conflict of man against fate 
that should draw our focus, nor the possibilities of fate subjugating man into some form 
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of determinism.  Instead it is our own relationship with fate that Nietzsche wants to focus 
our attention upon, that we may comprehend the magnitude of the decisions we 
ultimately are forced to make.52  The ethical imperative of eternal return cannot be 
dismissed nor can it be weakened by the status of the metaphysical claims.   
 The second interpretation that dogs Nietzsche’s doctrine of recurrence stems from 
the problem of the concept “same”.  Exactly what it is that is implied to repeat eternally is 
not so simple a thing to determine, as volumes of reactionary critiques can attest.  Is it 
literally precisely the same events that will recur or is there some ambiguity present in 
Nietzsche’s language that can offer a different hypothesis?  From an etymological 
standpoint, the German word das Gleiche is used where English translations place the 
word “same”.  There were other options open to Nietzsche, as most languages allow, but 
he chose das Gleiche as his operative term.  With the language barrier, unfortunately this 
term is difficult to translate directly.  While always interpreted as “the same”, the true 
meaning falls somewhere in-between the English words same and similar.  Joan 
Stambaugh offers the example of hats in her discussion of the terminology.  If two 
women were said to have the “same” hat on in terms of this German expression, then 
these hats would not literally be the same but would be so indistinguishable from each 
other to perception that unless one saw these women side-by-side, it would be assumed 
that the hat they wore was shared. 53  We are not therefore dealing with merely similar 
hats, but, with this translation, separate identities can still be maintained. 
 The insight this offers us is somewhat difficult to discern.  Nietzsche states again 
and again that the same will recur infinitely.  The identities of two different occurrences 
are different in that they occur within different cycles, yet we must not be tempted to 
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think of them as simply similar.  What comes again is what has happened before.  The 
exact same events will replay within the universe’s loop of infinity.  What meaning does 
it have to say that the same repeats?  If there is nothing outside of the cycle of universal 
repetition by which to gauge our particular place within the loops, then it seems as though 
it would be meaningless to pretend that there is such a thing as mere similitude yet not 
identity.54  Nietzsche demands that there can be no difference between two repetitions, so 
what can be made of this? 
 The postmodern author Jorge Luis Borges offers enigmatic clues to a possible 
understanding within his short story, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”.  In this 
bizarre tale, Pierre Menard sets out to write, from the novelty of his own pen, an exact, 
word-for-word replication of Miguel de Cervantes’s original masterpiece Don Quixote.55  
Menard aims ambitiously to make his next work literally the same as that of the great 
Cervantes.  Borges addresses this problematic issue of sameness when he reveals the 
reception of Menard’s book as the daunting task is finally completed.  Critics praise the 
text on its boldness, ambiguity, and richness despite it being a verbatim replica of a text 
that already exists.  Even the contrasting styles are pointed to as a credit to Menard’s 
brilliance.56  This might seem most comical until we realize the importance of the 
distinction.  Because Cervantes wrote his Quixote in the common prose of the 
seventeenth century, it is impressive but not astounding.  With nearly two centuries 
separating the copies, Menard’s version takes on the deliberately more challenging task 
of writing in another era’s idiom. 
The applicable point we can glean from this story is a key issue that the 
postmodernists seem prepared to confront:  identity.  The two books are the same in 
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every sense of the word, but one should be more praiseworthy than the other because of 
the context into which it is born.  So too it can be said that though two repetitions of 
eternal cycles are absolutely the same in every sense of the word, their identity’s remain 
distinct.  Under this definition of difference, we are forced to throw out any conceptions 
of identity that rely too heavily upon constituent parts and causational forces.  The danger 
of not doing so leads to one of two results for Nietzsche’s doctrine.  If there is no 
meaningful difference between one repetition’s identity and the next, then the idea of 
eternal return itself falls apart into meaningless tautology that can impress no burdensome 
weight upon us as Nietzsche insisted it must.  Alternately, if what repeats is not the 
actually the same, then the very existential imperative that gave us a non-religious 
foundation for how we ought to act loses its fangs entirely.  What obligation does cyclical 
time foist upon me if I will not be the one reliving it?   
 Interestingly, another postmodern thinker, Gilles Deleuze, denies the notion of 
literal sameness57 but attempts even so to rescue the all-important vestiges of the 
existential imperative that Nietzsche created.  What Deleuze sees as problematic within 
the idea of eternal return of the same is that a reactive force has the power to recur.  He 
splits the becoming of forces within the universe into two separate factions, those of 
action and those of reaction.  Since Deleuze deems reactive behavior as nihilistic and 
contrary to the overall goal of eternal recurrence to reintegrate purpose into our lives, 
reactive forces cannot be said to repeat without contradiction.58  The small man with his 
vengeful ressentiment therefore cannot repeat in the next cycle.  Only the creative is 
granted eternal return. 
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 In this way, Deleuze creates a kind of selective repetition that turns Nietzsche’s 
existential doctrine into what he perceives to be a far more cogent ethical, almost Kantian 
imperative of normative action.  He deems this the great “selective thought” and 
formulates in speech deliberately reminiscent of the Categorical Imperative the following 
mandate:  “whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return.”59  
To Deleuze, this willing must equal creation for only the active forces are capable of 
recurrence.  We are therefore capable of selecting those moments that we will into the 
next cycle of existence.  To support this claim, he cites a passage of Nietzsche’s within 
The Will to Power that seems to imply the same understanding of eternal return as being a 
selective ideal.60  Marking the reference made in Nietzsche’s own pen, Deleuze uproots 
the common interpretation of eternal return of the same, refusing outright that it is even 
necessarily the same world that will return to us again and again. 
 As thought provoking and insightful as this interpretation may be, it in no way 
resembles the philosophy that Nietzsche seems to have left us.  In fact Deleuze may have 
misinterpreted the very term “selective” to mean something other than intended.  The 
ontological status of selection within Nietzsche’s philosophy was abstracted from this 
single entry within The Will to Power; however other scholars take the same passage to 
refer merely to recurrence’s inclination towards strength rather than weakness.61  Any 
implication that this statement was made to hint at a new metaphysic of the doctrine of 
return is vastly overreaching. 
Deleuze seems to have hit upon a strong point though.  For it may seem that the 
negative forces of reactive ressentiment would have no place in a selective principle.  
Even so, in no uncertain terms Nietzsche states, within the same compilation, that what 
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repeats must be “absolutely identical.”62  While it may be contrary to our sense of 
universal justice or fairness, there can be no doubt that what weighed most heavily on the 
minds of Nietzsche and Zarathustra was the fact that even the small man returns 
eternally.  No matter how much we may wish it not to be so, even the nihilistic, slave 
morality that negates life and praises the other-worldly must recur again and again.  It is 
this very fact that took the greatest strength for Zarathustra to bear.  It is this absolute 
certainty that drove him time and again into convalescence and soul-crushing nausea.63  
To ignore this fact as Deleuze attempts is to fly in the face of nearly every other piece of 
writing that Nietzsche composed on the subject. 
 Deleuze seems to believe, in much the same way that Löwith did, that the 
existential imperative is negatively affected by the introduction of this element of literal 
return.  But in much the same way as we answered Löwith, we can answer Deleuze.  The 
will to affirm what will be anyway is not a desire to change what can occur; it is rather an 
owning of the fate that we have been given.  To believe that only selected actions can be 
repeated makes incoherent the idea of a same repetition.  One’s decision to own his fate 
is an acceptance of the absurdity that befalls him.  Claiming that our actions can 
positively affect the next cycle by willing what is creative and knowing that the small, 
reactive forces will fall away with the passing of the repetition is akin to believing in the 
adjudicating power of a higher being to grant heaven to some and hell to others.  The 
absurdity with comprehending that even the most worthless elements have the power to 
return again forces us to make the existential imperative out of genuine amor fati and not 
some juvenile hope or appeal to the justice of the universe. 
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 As for the underlying question of whether the same literally recurs or not, the 
point here is still worth analysis.  Here we begin to see again how the notion of identity 
becomes central to Nietzsche’s doctrine.  The analogy of the myth of Sisyphus returns to 
us once more.  Few would doubt that there is an actual, metaphysical distinction between 
the thousandth and the thousand and first times that Sisyphus pushes the boulder up the 
mountain.  However, if nothing ever changes between each repetition of the act, it is all 
but meaningless to even count them.  There will never be an end to Sisyphus’s toil, just 
as Nietzsche asserts that we too will eternally repeat our labors.  But identity cannot be so 
easily explained.  Again we come to the problem that if it is not literally me that must 
repeat the act for all eternity, then it is meaningless to concern myself with the existential 
weight of each decision.  For Nietzsche’s thought to hold its power, it must be the same 
me, the same everything that recurs time and again.  This is of course paradoxical.  There 
can be no logical enumeration of the selves that have occurred if there is nothing to 
differentiate them.  It is here that we find once again how troublesome the thought of 
eternal return can be to our ordinary conceptions of time and identity.   
 
Conclusion: 
 
 These two thinkers provide perfect exemplars of the kinds of interpretive work 
that is done pertaining to Nietzsche’s greatest burden.  Löwith argues in his book that 
Nietzsche is logically incoherent with his description of the conditions of eternal return, 
refusing to accept that the existential imperative can coexist with a metaphysical doctrine.  
Deleuze accepts that there is merit within the imperative but wishes to comprehend this 
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credo through an obscure interpretation gleaned from the pages of Nietzsche’s personal 
writings.  His assessment borders on being life negating in its insistence upon a 
subsequent cycle where the creative returns and the reactive disappears.  But what both 
Löwith and Deleuze have in common in their interpretations and critiques is that they 
seem uncomfortable with the idea that Nietzsche is saying exactly what he seems to be 
saying.  Many argue similarly by decreeing that the doctrine of eternal recurrence was 
never meant to be more than a thought,64 as though this can defeat the troublesome 
paradoxes that result from its application into a rigorous philosophy. 
 While these methods of disregarding the completeness of Nietzsche’s conception 
of eternal return each possess valid reasons for wanting to cast aside one element or 
another of the overall doctrine, this is an approach that I believe is necessarily over-
simplistic.  Attempting to contort the seemingly incongruent paradoxes of Nietzsche’s 
greatest puzzle removes the sting from the sublime ambiguity.  He was a forceful thinker 
with ideas that often became philosophically enigmatic.  It should not be assumed that 
these conundrums indicate that the distinct formulation for eternal return should be 
overlooked or remolded in any way.  Whatever factors pose a problem for us somehow 
did not pose a problem for Nietzsche.  Regardless of whether we ultimately choose to 
affirm or deny the validity of the precept, first attempting to understand why Nietzsche 
was able to proclaim it as he did, as the “greatest weight”,65 is pivotal to truly 
comprehending his philosophy.  We must take eternal return on its own terms, as it is 
actually presented to us, or not at all. 
 As we have seen, however, even after correcting the misinterpretations of those 
unwilling to confront eternal return as it is, there are still philosophical paradoxes that 
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will not go away.  Nietzsche at times seems to possess in overabundance the quality of 
speaking in contradictions that Jaspers once praised him for.66  Perhaps these contrary 
paradoxes are unintentional flaws in the doctrine, but I find this implausible.  Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, an early inspiration for the young Nietzsche, surely imparted his 
loathing for consistency and belief in the inscrutability of great minds upon his reader.67  
Nietzsche certainly appreciated the importance of the problems within his work, as his 
own strongest critic,68 but did not back down from his assertions.  Perhaps the ambiguity 
of interpretation was precisely what he strived for. 
Eternal return was never meant to be a finality of thought.  Nietzsche wanted no 
disciples and would have cringed at the notion of any great mind abdicating its creative 
power and intellectual capacity for the sake of his own doctrine.  In fact, in Beyond Good 
and Evil, Nietzsche speaks to the fear that grows within him.  He writes: 
“Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts!  It was not 
long ago that you were still so colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and 
secret spices—you made me sneeze and laugh—and now?  You have already 
taken off your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths:  they 
already look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull!”69 
 
 The fear Nietzsche has that his thoughts are becoming truths should stress for us 
the importance he placed on inscrutability and enigma.  We must never forget that his 
position as author and philosopher was meant as a catalyst for our own thinking and 
ruminating.  The eternal return of the same is the most serious of Nietzsche’s challenges 
to our minds, and the higher man is encouraged to slowly, intellectually digest this 
thought for himself. 
Gadon 31 
No matter how confounding the metaphysical proofs, interpretations, and 
refutations can become, what eternal return ultimately brings us back to is the simple, 
uncomfortable question:  how would we respond to the soothsaying demon who whispers 
secrets of recurrence into our ears on the darkest of hours?  If it isn’t with an affirmative 
cry of “da capo”, then we must ask ourselves why.  To what degree do we actively strive 
to make our lives worth reliving again and again?  Do we live our lives gazing off 
towards some far-off conjunction to answer the demon’s challenge, as Zarathustra’s 
dwarf confidently asserted, or do we accept the heaviest burden of living under the 
gateway Moment? 
In the text, Zarathustra slowly learned of his own destiny to explicate the doctrine 
of eternal return to all of mankind.  Nietzsche felt himself possessed of a similar goal.  
Teaching man to live under the brilliant sun of a supreme Moment, a “Great Noon”70 
when all shadows are vanquished and all lies disappear from the perception of man’s 
ultimate truth, was his lifelong aim.  It is this concept that must be kept constantly in 
mind when interpreting Nietzsche’s writing.  If we read of eternal recurrence and yet still 
see the emptiness of shadows stretching out from the soles of our shoes, then we have not 
truly forced ourselves to encounter that supreme Moment.  Constant vigilance must be 
fostered in such a delicately enigmatic philosophy, lest we find our interpretations falling 
shy of the benchmark set by the very man who challenged our minds in the first place.     
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